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We are fixated on technology and technological success, and we have no sustained 
or systematic approach to field-based social understanding of our adversaries' 
motivation, intent, will, and the dreams that drive their strategic vision, however 
strange those dreams and vision may seem to us. 
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PATHWAYS TO AND FROM VIOLENT EXTREMISM: THE CASE FOR SCIENCE-
BASED FIELD RESEARCH 
Chairman Nelson, Ranking Member LeMieux, and Senators, I appreciate your letting 
me, an anthropologist, relate my views on the U.S. government's strategy and 
efforts to counter violent extremism and radicalization and the military's role in 
these efforts. I've been with would-be martyrs and holy warriors from Morocco's 
Atlantic shore to Indonesia's outer islands, and from Gaza to Kashmir. My field 
experience and studies in diverse cultural settings inform my views. 
This an apt moment for such a hearing, given the recent uptick in homegrown 
terror activities, the failed Christmas Day airliner attack, and further rooting of Al 
Qaeda's viral social movement in Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia, the Maghreb, and the 
worldwide web. 
First of all, there is a deep lack of Field-Based Scientific Research on 
Pathways to and from Political and Group Violence. To be specific: 
• At present, we spend tens of billions of dollars to equip and protect 
our service members, but only fractions of that are spent on 
understanding the pathways to and from violent extremism, which 
maybe even more important for keeping our country safe and our 
service men and women out of harm's way. 
• The concept of science-based field research — embedded in potential 
hotspots and open to public verification and replication, with clear 
ways and means to falsify what is wrong — is often misunderstood in 
Washington. Most legislators and policy makers think that we have a 
great deal of this type of research being undertaken and funded. We 
don't. 
• I f you want to be successful in the long run where it counts — in 
stopping the next and future generations of disaffected youth from 
finding their life's meaning in the thrill and adventure of joining their 
friends in taking on the world's mightiest power; if this committee is to 
be truly relevant in solving the radicalization problem that it poses, 
then you have to understand these pathways that take young people 
to and from political and group violence. Then, knowing these 
pathways, you can do what needs to be done. 
• Quality field-based scientific research can help save lives and 
treasury. Here is how it works. With assistance from the Air Force 
Office of Scientific Research, Air Force Research Lab, the Army 
Research Office, the Office of Naval Research and the National Science 
Foundation, my associates and I put anthropologists, sociologists, 
political scientists, psychologists, mathematicians, and sometimes 
even physicists and chemists into interdisciplinary teams in a conflict 
region. We then begin to explore the nature of the conflict with 
leaders, community members, and youth. We follow up with an 
experimental design — which allows ready replication of initial results 
or falsification of our hypotheses — to understand pathways to and 
from violence. 
Here are a few of our general findings on recent changes in paths to violent 
extremism: 
• As my colleague Juan Zarate described in his January 27 testimony 
before the House Armed Services Committee, as a result of formidable 
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U.S. military and intelligence efforts, Al Qaeda is on the ropes globally, 
faced with ever dwindling financial and popular support, and drastically 
diminished ability to hook up with other extremists worldwide, much 
less command and control them for major operations against us. 
• The main security concern no longer comes from any organization, 
or from well-trained cadres of volunteers who typically had some 
advanced education, often in engineering and medical studies. The 
threat today is from a Qaeda –inspired viral social and political 
movement that abuses religion in the name of defending a purist form 
Sunni Islam, and which is particularly contagious among Muslim youth 
who are increasingly marginalized — economically, socially, politically 
— and are in transition stages in their lives, such as immigrants, 
students, and those in search of friends, mates and jobs. 
• Economic globalization, which has led to greater access by 
humankind to material opportunity, has also led to a crisis, even 
collapse, of cultures, as people unmoored from millennial traditions 
flail about in search of a social identity. Today's most virulent 
terrorism is rooted in rootlessness and restlessness. This gives an 
opening for embrace by the radical fraternity that preaches the jihadi 
cause, whose oxygen is the publicity provided by global media. The 
Qaeda movement is largely a diaspora phenomenon of people who 
enlist, rather than are recruited, outside their country of origin. 
• The widespread notion of a "clash of civilizations" along traditional 
historical "fault lines" is woefully misleading. Violent extremism 
represents a crash of traditional territorial cultures, not their 
resurgence. Individuals now mostly radicalize horizontally with their 
peers, rather than vertically through institutional leaders or 
organizational hierarchies. They do so mostly in small groups of 
friends — from the same neighborhood or social network — or even as 
loners who find common cause with a virtual internet community. 
• Entry into the jihadi brotherhood is from the bottom up: from 
alienated and marginalized youth seeking out companionship, esteem, 
and meaning, but also the thrill of action, sense of empowerment, and 
glory in fighting the world's most powerful nation and army. In an 
ongoing study for the Army, my colleague Marc Sageman finds that 
popular jihadi Internet Imams, like Anwar al-Awlaki, are important not 
because they brainwash, command, or even guide others to actions 
and targets. Rather, popular radical Imams serve as "attractors" 
whose message and presence draws into line a searching soul who has 
already pretty much chosen his own path. Maj. Hassan, for example, 
sent over a score of email messages to Awlaki but received only two 
back, with no operational implications. 
• Gallup and Pew surveys indicate that perhaps 7 percent of the 
world's Muslim population — nearly 100 million people — sympathize 
with jihadi aspirations. But of those many millions, only a few 
thousands actually commit to violence. Our data show that a reliable 
predictor of whether or not someone joins the Jihad is being a member 
of an action-oriented group of friends. It's surprising how many soccer 
buddies join together. 
• The boundaries of the newer terrorist networks are very loose and 
fluid, and the internet now allows anyone who wishes to become a 
terrorist to become one, anywhere, anytime. More and more, terror 
networks are intertwined with petty criminal networks: drug 
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trafficking, stolen cars, credit card fraud, and the like. This 
development is in part an unintended consequence of two of our 
successes: financial policing forced would-be terrorists to rely on local, 
low-cost, informal, underground methods of financing; and disruption 
of their organizations meant that terrorists would have to find new 
clandestine means for acquiring weapons and managing logistics. 
• Although lack of economic opportunity often reliably leads to 
criminality, it turns out that some criminal youth really don't want to 
be criminals after all. Given half a chance to take up a moral cause, 
they can be even more altruistically prone than others to give up their 
lives for their comrades and cause. This is one indication — and our 
research reveals others — that economic opportunities alone may not 
turn people away from the path to political violence. (Indeed, material 
incentives, whether "carrots" or "sticks," can even backfire when they 
threaten core values, as our recent research has shown for Israel, 
Palestine, Indonesia, and Iran). Rather, youth must be given hopes 
and dreams of achievement, and plausible means to realize such 
hopes and dreams. 
• Therefore, a coherent program to counter extremist violence should 
focus on peer-to-peer efforts, not elders trying to teach youth about 
moderation or the Koran. It will take mobilizing the purpose-seeking, 
risk-taking, adventurous spirit of youth for heroic action. Today, 
"Happiness is martyrdom" can be as emotionally contagious to kids in 
a forlorn urban African neighborhood or to a lost youth on the Internet 
as "Yes, we can." That is a stunning and far-reaching development 
that we must learn to steer in the right direction. 
Why Present U.S Efforts to Counter Radicalization Abroad Fall Short: 
• For two main reasons: We are fixated on technology and 
technological success, and we have no sustained or systematic 
approach to field-based social understanding of our adversaries' 
motivation, intent, will, and the dreams that drive their strategic 
vision, however strange those dreams and vision may seem to us. 
• On the intelligence side, the Christmas Day bombing attempt was a 
deep failing caused, in part, by too great a reliance on technology to 
the detriment of social intelligence. Computers, and the stochastic 
models and algorithms they use, are not particularly well suited to pick 
up the significance of the almost unimaginable psychological effort it 
took for one of the most respected men in a nation to swallow his 
pride and love of family and walk into an American embassy to say 
that his son was being dangerously radicalized. Widgets — for which 
there are billions of dollars — cannot do the job of socially sensitive 
thinkers — for whom there is relatively little concrete support — in 
creating alliances, leveraging non military advantages, reading 
intentions, building trust, changing opinions, managing perceptions, 
and empathizing (though not necessarily sympathizing) with others so 
as to understand, and change, what moves them to do what they do. 
• On the military side, career advancement in the armed forces 
privileges operational prowess and combat experience, which are 
necessary to gain victory in battles. But different abilities also may be 
necessarily for winning without having to fight, or for ending a war in 
Lincoln's definitive sense of destroying enemies by making them into 
friends. After all, as George Marshall well understood, that is what 
American efforts at democratization abroad are ultimately about. 
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Soldiers continue to be trained and rewarded as operators and combat 
organizers, but they are not as adequately trained for the political 
mission they are now being asked to carry out, which requires cultural 
and psychological expertise at being social mediators, managers and 
movers. As one Air Force General said to me: "I was trained for Ds 
¬— defeat, destroy, devastate — now I'm told we have responsibility 
for the Rs — rebuild, reform, renew. Well, I was never trained for that, 
so what the Hell am I supposed to do? Destroy in just the right way to 
rebuild?" 
• A serious problem in our cooperation with intelligence and military 
counterparts in several countries — for example, Morocco, Egypt, 
Uzbekistan —is that they have trouble even recognizing they have 
homegrown problems of radicalization that are not due to the West or 
to some nebulous "Jihad International." 
• We're winning against Al Qaeda and its associates in places where 
antiterrorism efforts are local and built on an understanding that the 
ties binding terrorist networks today are more about social 
connections than political or ideological. I recently argued in the New 
York Times ("To Beat Al Qaeda, Look to the East," Dec. 13, 2009) that 
using knowledge friendship, kinship and discipleship has been very 
successful in Southeast Asia, and shows promise for Afghanistan and 
Pakistan. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee, in its January 20, 
2010 report on "Al Qaeda in Yemen and Somalia" also recommends, 
as part of U.S. strategy, the understanding that I outlined, although I 
believe that more research is needed there to support that 
recommendation. 
At home, efforts by intelligence and law enforcement to counter 
radicalization have been minimally disruptive of society and effective, and 
could better inform efforts abroad. 
• Success at home is greatly facilitated by the fact that the 
overwhelming majority of Muslim immigrants into the United States, 
unlike in Europe, become rapidly and thoroughly integrated into 
mainstream American society. Immigrant Muslims generally buy into 
the American dream and succeed in education, in the economy, and in 
maintaining a strong, composite sense of both Muslim and American 
identity. 
• The approach of the NYPD, informed by its fine intelligence analysis 
unit and keen sensitivity to the city's diverse cultural makeup, is 
exemplary. Recent proposals by the FBI's Community Relations Unit 
hold reasonable promise for preventing radicalization by building 
resilience in potential hotspot communities. I have asked the FBI to 
provide a summary of its program to you, and it is has been made 
available as a handout. 
• Recent community outreach programs in the UK, the Netherlands, 
and Denmark are trying to build resilience within their Muslim 
communities to radicalization, and they are experimenting with a 
variety of different local initiatives to see what works best. A drawback 
is that in some cases they use anti-democratic interlocutors (Salafis 
and Wahhabis) to reach out and bring back would-be jihadis into the 
non-violent fold. That has given Islamist groups prestige in the 
community and validated them to some degree. 
• Yet, in some Muslim countries, like Indonesia and Saudi Arabia, 
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Salafi and Wahhabi initiatives have been the most effective at drawing 
young Muslims back from violence. 
• Turkey's approach, like that of Indonesia and Saudi Arabia, treats 
jihadi terrorism more as an issue of public health and community 
responsibility than as a criminal or military matter. That approach 
appears to be producing positive results. 
Involve Social Scientists, but Not In Theater 
• There is a pressing need for fieldwork by social scientists in actual 
and potential conflict zones. There is also compelling case for involving 
social scientists in helping to form cultural and social awareness in the 
military theater. Nevertheless, social scientists should not be directly 
embedded with military units in theater. 
• For example, I do not think that efforts like the Human Terrain 
System experiment in Afghanistan are all that promising. It is the 
infantry units themselves that should be trained before they go in 
theater to be culturally sensitive, and not have to rely on temporarily 
embedded "combat ethnographers" who move from unit to unit, thus 
undoing the personal connections that may have made them effective 
with the local population by providing medical aid and other needed 
non military services. 
• More important for our nation, such efforts as these, small as they 
are, are potentially quite counterproductive. They only further alienate 
most social science academics from the military or, indeed, from any 
involvement in U.S. policy decision making that involves projection of 
power or conflict. The military and cultural reality of the terrain may 
favor having embedded social scientists be uniformed and armed (in 
part, because unarmed Western civilians would more likely draw fire 
as high-value targets). But the possibility that social scientists 
themselves would have to fire their weapons and perhaps kill local 
people — indeed, the mere sight of armed and uniformed American 
social scientists in a foreign theater — is guaranteed to engender 
academia's deep hostility. 
• Ever since the Vietnam War, there has been mutual antipathy and 
antagonism between most academic social science — at least at the 
outstanding universities — and U.S. military operations and military-
related policymaking. But unlike the case with the Vietnam War, many 
social scientists today believe that violent extremism is a danger that 
needs to be dealt with. Training and rewarding soldiers for being 
culturally knowledgeable and socially savvy — which goes beyond 
learning a language or studying a checklist of cultural preferences and 
habits — could be so much more effective for achieving our country's 
political and military mission. Moreover, involvement of top social 
scientists in deliberations such as these, and in publicly transparent 
field projects, could help heal the divide between some of our best 
thinkers and policymakers and operators. 
A Coherent Program to Counter Violent Extremism Should Focus On: 
• Preventing radicalization to violence — especially among youth and 
the next generation. 
• Countering radicalization that has progressed to violence, by de-
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coupling the Qaeda movement from the local and cultural grievances 
and national movements that Qaeda tries to co-opt. For example, the 
Taliban and Somalia's Islamic Courts, unlike Al Qaeda, are interested 
in their homeland, not ours, and all need to be dealt with very 
differently. 
• De-radicalizing those who have committed to violence. Although a 
"public health" approach to radicalization would be hard to legally 
implement in the USA, it has been part of the apparent success of the 
de-radicalization program initiated by General Douglas Stone in Iraqi 
prisons, which gives families and communities responsibility for 
keeping former detainees out of trouble. In a reversal of the policies 
that led to the abuses of Abu Ghraib, that program has seriously 
addressed the cultural sensitivities of detainees and respect for their 
persons.  
Summary: De-radicalization, like Radicalization, is Better from Bottom Up 
than Top Down 
When you look at young people like the ones who grew up to blow up trains in 
Madrid in 2004, carried out the slaughter on the London underground in 2005, 
hoped to blast airliners out of the sky en route to the United States in 2006 and 
2009, and journeyed far to die killing infidels in Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen 
or Somalia; when you look at whom they idolize, how they organize, what bonds 
them and what drives them; then you see that what inspires the most lethal 
terrorists in the world today is not so much the Koran or religious teachings as a 
thrilling cause and call to action that promises glory and esteem in the eyes of 
friends, and through friends, eternal respect and remembrance in the wider world 
that they will never live to enjoy. 
Our data show that most young people who join the jihad had a moderate and 
mostly secular education to begin with, rather than a radical religious one. And 
where in modern society do you find young people who hang on the words of older 
educators and "moderates"? Youth generally favors actions, not words, and 
challenge, not calm. That's a big reason so many who are bored, underemployed, 
overqualified, and underwhelmed by hopes for the future turn on to jihad with their 
friends. Jihad is an egalitarian, equal-opportunity employer (at least for boys, but 
girls are web-surfing into the act): fraternal, fast-breaking, thrilling, glorious, and 
cool. Anyone is welcome to try his hand at slicing off the head of Goliath with a 
paper cutter. 
If we can discredit their vicious idols (show how these bring murder and mayhem to 
their own people) and give these youth new heroes who speak to their hopes rather 
than just to ours, then we've got a much better shot at slowing the spread of jihad 
to the next generation than we do just with bullets and bombs. And if we can de-
sensationalize terrorist actions, like suicide bombings, and reduce their fame (don't 
help advertise them or broadcast our hysterical response, for publicity is the oxygen 
of terrorism), the thrill will die down. As Saudi Arabia's General Khaled Alhumaidan 
said to me in Riyadh: "The front is in our neighborhoods but the battle is the silver 
screen. If it doesn't make it to the 6'oclock news, then Al Qaeda is not interested." 
Thus, the terrorist agenda could well extinguish itself altogether, doused by its own 
cold raw truth: it has no life to offer. This path to glory leads only to ashes and rot. 
In the long run, perhaps the most important anti-terrorism measure of all is to 
provide alternative heroes and hopes that are more enticing and empowering than 
any moral lessons or material offerings. Jobs that relieve the terrible boredom and 
inactivity of immigrant youth in Europe, and with underemployed throughout much 
of the Muslim world, cannot alone offset the alluring stimulation of playing at war in 
contexts of continued cultural and political alienation and little sense of shared 
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aspirations and destiny. It is also important to provide alternate local networks and 
chat rooms that speak to the inherent idealism, sense of risk and adventure, and 
need for peer approval that young people everywhere tend towards. It even could 
be a 21st-century version of what the Boy Scouts and high school football teams 
did for immigrants and potentially troublesome youth as America urbanized a 
century ago. Ask any cop on the beat: those things work. But it has to be done with 
the input and insight of local communities or it won't work: de-radicalization, like 
radicalization itself, best engages from the bottom up, not from the top down. 
In sum, there are many millions of people who express sympathy with Al Qaeda or 
other forms of violent political expression that support terrorism. They are 
stimulated by a massive, media-driven global political awakening which, for the first 
time in human history, can "instantly" connect anyone, anywhere to a common 
cause — provided the message that drives that cause is simple enough not to 
require much cultural context to understand it: for example, the West is 
everywhere assaulting Muslims, and Jihad is the only the way to permanently 
resolve glaring problems caused by this global injustice. 
Consider the parable told by the substitute Imam at the Al Quds Mosque in 
Hamburg, where the 9/11 bomber pilots hung out, when Marc Sageman and I 
asked him "Why did they do it?" 
"There were two rams, one with horns and one without. The one with horns butted 
his head against the defenseless one. In the next world, Allah switched the horns 
from one ram to the other, so justice could prevail." 
"Justice" ('adl in Arabic) is the watchword of Jihad. Thunderously simple. When 
justice and Jihad and are joined to "change" — the elemental soundbite of our age 
— and oxygenated by the publicity given to spectacular acts of violence, then the 
mix becomes heady and potent. 
Young people constantly see and discuss among themselves images of war and 
injustice against "our people," become morally outraged (especially if injustice 
resonates personally, which is more of a problem abroad than at home), and dream 
of a war for justice that gives their friendship cause. But of the millions who 
sympathize with the jihadi cause, only some thousands show willingness to actually 
commit violence. They almost invariably go on to violence in small groups of 
volunteers consisting mostly of friends and some kin within specific "scenes": 
neighborhoods, schools (classes, dorms), workplaces, common leisure activities 
(soccer, study group, barbershop, café) and, increasingly, online chat-rooms. 
A key problem with proposals on what to do about radicalization to violent 
extremism is lack of field experience with the context-sensitive processes of 
selection into violence within these scenes. To understand and manage the local 
pathways to and from violent extremism requires science-based field research that 
is open to public verification and replicable, with clear ways and means to falsify 
what is wrong so as to better and better approximate what is truly right. 
I am at your disposal to work with you on understanding how these processes and 
pathways to radicalization operate in the field in potential conflict regions around 
the world. 
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